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Abstract—Community network (CN) initiatives have been around
for roughly two decades, evangelizing a distinctly different paradigm
for building, maintaining, and sharing network infrastructure but
also defending the basic human right to Internet access. Over this
time they have evolved into a mosaic of systems that vary widely
with respect to their network technologies, their offered services, their
organizational structure, and the way they position themselves in the
overall telecommunications’ ecosystem. Common to all these highly
differentiated initiatives is the sustainability challenge. We approach
sustainability as a broad term with an economical, political, and
cultural context. We first review the different perceptions of the term.
These vary both across and within the different types of stakeholders
involved in CNs and are reflected in their motivation to join such
initiatives. Then, we study the diverse ways that CN operators pursue
the sustainability goal. Depending on the actual context of the term,
these range all the way from mechanisms to fund their activities and
synergistic approaches with commercial service providers, to organi-
zational structures and social activities that serve as incentives tomaxi-
mize the engagement of their members. Finally, we iterate and discuss
theoretical concepts of incentive mechanisms that have been proposed
in the literature for these networks as well as implemented tools and
processes designed to set the ground for CN participation. While,
theoreticalmechanisms leverage game theory, reputation frameworks,
and social mechanisms, implemented mechanisms focus on organiza-
tionalmatters, education and services, all aiming tomotivate the active
and sustained participation of users and other actors in the CN.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. CNs: history, evolution and current status
Community networks (CNs) are networks inspired, built and
managed by citizens and non-profit organizations. They are
crowdsourced initiatives where people combine their efforts and
resources in a collective manner to instantiate communication
network infrastructures.
While the phenomenon of community initiatives in the field of
media is as old as the distinct media themselves, CNs originally
surfaced in the late 90s and have taken many forms and shapes ever
since. Typically, these CNs are initiated by tiny groups of people,
usually in the range of one to ten, who more often than not are driven
by strong cultural and political motives. They contribute to the fight
against the digital divide through the provision of telecommunication
services in under-served areas, the desire for autonomy and self-
organization practices, the right to open, neutral networks and
privacy, the experimentation with technology in do-it-yourself
manner, and the commitment to community ideals and needs.
Whereas some CNs have become obsolete due to the rise of com-
mercial high speed broadband networks in the areas CNs operated,
others have flourished and evolved into alternative telecommunica-
tion network models (section I-B). Not only have they filled in the
coverage gaps of commercial operators providing telecom services
in rural areas, but they have also developed rich organizational
frameworks with various tools and mechanisms. Typically, these
frameworks emerge as a result of past experiences, successful
and unsuccessful practices and accumulated knowledge. They are
meant to systematize the network’s governance, management and
operation and ensure the CNs sustainability. The establishment of
functional economic models is a key factor to this end.
B. Current motivating factors and new paths for CNs
With a few notable exceptions (e.g., [6]), most community
networks have been viewed (and have been viewing themselves)
as alternative networks that are incompatible with any commercial
notion, not least because of the strong cultural/political values of
the small groups that initiated them. Yet, there seem to currently
exist additional good reasons that motivate a reiteration of their
positioning in the overall telecommunications landscape and new
approaches to their sustainability.
1) Contributing to broadband connectivity goals: Broadband
Internet access has been promoted as a core priority of political
agendas throughout the world. In Europe, for example, the
European Commission (EC) has set ambitious policy objectives
for the years to come, summarized under the EC broadband 20201
and 20252 agendas. These agendas demand huge investment costs
and grassroots initiatives such as CNs are acknowledged as one
possible response to this challenge and one of four ways to involve
public authorities in the realization of the broadband vision [19].
Community broadband networks such as the Catalan guifi CN [6]
are singled out in the EC website as best practices in this respect.
2) Realizing Internet access in developing regions: More than
half of the world’s population –specifically women, the poor and
marginalised populations in developing areas– are still offline [24].
Many large industrial corporations such as Google, Microsoft and
1https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/broadband-strategy-policy
2https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/broadband-europe
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Fig. 1: Radar charts following CN characteristics i.e., types of services and infrastructure used, number of participating nodes. (a) CN
services. 0: local services as default (Internet connectivity available upon request, manual configuration), 1: mix of local services and
Internet connectivity, 2: Internet connectivity as the main service (only management tools as local services), 3: Internet connectivity only.
(b) CN Infrastructure. 0: mostly backbone network, access points offered by certain individuals through their home routers, 1: mostly
backbone, good access points, 2: mostly access network (backbone is used to connect to the Internet or interconnect small ”islands”),
3: only access network (no backbone network). (c) CN Size. 0: Very small (number of nodes<100), 1: Small (100< number of nodes
<1000), 2: Medium (1000< number of nodes <10.000), 3: Large (number of nodes >10.000).
Facebook have stated ambitious objectives for connecting another
billion users around the globe. These initiatives are commercial, for-
profit and often do not plan access to the open Internet. Combining
the Do-It-Yourself culture with provisions for unlicensed spectrum
and cheap fibre, small crowdfunded community operators that
create local value for the local people, without need for complex
and centralized systems, may be the obvious way to go about
realizing the vision of Internet access to developing regions.
3) Democratization of the telecommunication market: The
market of telecom services is usually composed of monopolies
and oligopolies that concentrate significant amount of power.
The prevention of telecommunications market distortions and
the openness of networks is a key goal set by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) [33], the EC [19], and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) [23]. Monopolies lead to vertically integrated models,
where all the layers of the network belong to one entity and end users
are left with limited options when it comes to choosing an operator.
The way they are built and operated makes CNs an ideal
candidate model for separating the network infrastructure from the
service provision layer. This separation generates opportunities for
sharing the related costs between multiple players and opening the
network to public administrations and commercial entities such as
local/regional ISPs (we elaborate on this model in section II.C).
Our survey does not aim at presenting the status of the hundreds
of CN efforts around the globe, nor is it a review of the technologies
used in CNs today. Such information is already available in the CN
literature [62], [37], [27]. Instead, the focus of this survey is on the
multiple, often complementary, ways different CN initiatives pursue
their sustainability. We approach sustainability as a multi-faceted
term, with technical, economic, socio-cultural and political context.
We review how these networks fund their activities; which ones
have been the dominant motives behind their initiation and which
ones are the aspirations of other actors when participating in them;
and what kind of tools and processes are in place as incentives in
the different CNs to best respond to these motives and aspirations.
Most of the material for this survey originates from interviews,
both in-person and questionnaire-based, carried out in the context
of the netCommons R&D project [30], [31]. Another big part, on
proposed participation incentives and mechanisms, is the result of
an exhaustive review of the existing scientific literature on the topic.
Fifteen CNs are primarily discussed in this paper, as listed in Table
I-B2. They are selected as good representatives of the diversity
in existing CNs with respect to size, supported services (local
services vs. Internet access), network scope/role (backbone network
vs. access network), geographical area of coverage (urban areas
with rich communication alternatives vs.rural under-served areas),
organizational structure (involved actors and decision-making
processes), and funding sources. The radar chart of Fig. 1 depicts
how these fifteen CNs score on the first three attributes (size,
services, network role) on a 0-3 scale.
In the remainder of the survey, we first present the layered
network infrastructure model, which aims at maximal openness and
involvement of actors, and explore how CNs fit in it as open access
network instances (section II). Then, in section III, we iterate on the
participation motives of different actors and their implications for
the CN sustainability. In section IV, we elaborate on the economic
sustainability aspects and the funding sources of CNs. Finally,
we investigate actual and theoretical practices adopted by CNs or
proposed in the literature (section V), before concluding in section
VI with a list of the most valuable insights out of the survey.
II. NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURES AND
COMMUNITY NETWORKS
In order to understand how CNs fit in the broader picture
of broadband networks, we contemplate the typical network
infrastructure layers, the basic actors and the business models –as
they are met in most networks– below.
3CN Location Networkingtechnology Internet Description
AWMN Greece wifi Yes*
Built by network technicians, enthusiasts and radio amateurs. Contains native services
without need for public Internet connectivity i.e., games, libraries, network monitoring
tools, DNS solutions, and experimental platforms. (2002)
B4RN UK fibre Yes Started by a local volunteer, who led the group as a networking expert. Aimed atbridging the digital divide. Based exclusively on fiber.(2011)
Consume UK wifi Yes
One of the first CNs to be conceived and deployed in Europe. The original motivation
was to save Internet access fees for conducting business. It has epitomised the
anti-commercial model of networking. Not active anymore. (2000)
FFDN France, Belgium wifi, DSL/fibre Yes An umbrella organization embracing 28 CNs operating across France. Adheres tovalues of collaboration, openness and support of human rights (freedom of expression,
privacy). (2011)
Free2Air UK wired, wifi Yes An alternative to the commercial Internet provision. Run by a small number of artistsand a number of other individuals until 2015. (1999)
Freifunk Germany fibre, wifi Yes An open initiative that supports free computer networks in Germany. It attracted manyartists, activists and tech enthusiasts from all over Europe. (2002)
Funkfeuer Austria wireless Yes A free experimental wireless network across Austria, committed to the idea of DIY,built and currently maintained by a group of computer enthusiasts. (2003)
guifi.net Spain fibre, wifi Yes* Started in Osona to serve remote rural areas that were not covered by conventionalISPs. Applies the principles of CPR management. (2004)
i4Free Greece wifi Yes The initiative of a German engineer and professor in an island of Greece with poorInternet connectivity. (2014)
Ninux Italy wifi No Experimentation and hacking culture. Ninux operates as an experimental platformfor decentralized protocols, policies and technologies. (2003)
Rhizomatica Mexico wireless Yes
Provides GSM services. Creates open-source technology and helps communities to
build their own networks. Initiated by a small group of people with knowledge of
community organization and technology. (2009)
Sarantaporo.gr Greece wireless Yes People with origins from the area of Sarantaporo wanted to create a website for theirvillage when they realized that there was no network connection. (2010)
TakNET Thailand wifi Yes
Established as an academic project at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). Follows
the goal of bridging the digital divide in Thailand villages. Composed of TakNET1,
TakNET2 and TakNET3. (2012)
Wireless Leiden Netherlands wifi Yes
Volunteer-based open, inexpensive, fast wireless network in Leiden and surrounding
villages. Developed by a group of local residents. Provides Internet access and free
local communication. (2002)
Zenzeleni.net South Africa wifi
Yes, VoIP
public
phones
Initiated by researchers from the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in the rural
under-developed area of Mankosi. Solar powered network. Operated as an umbrella
co-operative enterprise and a telecoms provider. (2013)
TABLE I: Basic information about the 15 CN instances that are analyzed further in the survey. These are chosen as representative instances
of the rich variety of worldwide CNs.
A. Network Infrastructure Layers
Considering how a broadband network is created, its structure
can be decomposed into three distinct but inter-dependent layers:
a) passive infrastructure, b) active infrastructure and c) services.
Passive infrastructure
Active infrastructure
Services
Fig. 2: The layers of a broadband network.
The passive infrastructure layer expresses the non-electronic
physical equipment needed to deploy the network. Non-electric
elements vary depending on the link technology in use, e.g., fibre,
copper, antennas. They typically refer to ducts, cables, masts,
towers, technical premises, easements etc.The passive infrastructure
is built to endure for many years, usually decades. Its development
demands high capital expenditure (CAPEX) and frequent upgrades
are difficult to realize. However, its operational costs (OPEX) are
relatively low.
The second layer, i.e., active infrastructure, describes
the electronic physical equipment of a network such as routers,
switches, transponders, control and management servers. The OPEX
of the active equipment is high (i.e., electricity costs) but its capital
expenditure is usually low since it involves up-to-date technological
elements. The active equipment needs to follow the rapid advances
of technology and get renewed frequently, i.e., within a decade.
The third and highest layer of a broadband network is the layer of
services. It corresponds to the telecommunication services provided
on top of the passive and active infrastructure. These services may
be both private and public and include electronic government, ed-
ucation, health, commerce, Internet, entertainment, telephony (e.g.,
VoIP), access to media content (television, radio, movies) and many
more. End users usually pay a fee for receiving the services either
directly or indirectly. The type of reimbursement depends on the cho-
sen network infrastructure model and the business actors involved.
The implementation of the service layer is conditioned on the de-
ployment of the passive and active infrastructure. Therefore, the first
two layers are a prerequisite for the existence of the third one (Fig.2).
4Acronym Description
AP Access Point
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
CN Community Network
CONFINE Community Networks Testbed for the Future Internet
CPR Common Pool Resource
CS Community Service
DIY Do-It-Yourself
DNS Domain Name Server
EC European Commission
EU European Union
GFOSS Greek Free/Open Source Software Society
ICT Information and Communication Technology
ISP Internet Service Provider
ITU International Telecommunications Union
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
NCL Network Commons License
NP Network Provider
NPO Non-Profit Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEX Operational Expenditure
P2P Peer to Peer
P2PWNC Peer-to-peer Wireless Network Confederation
PIP Physical Infrastructure Provider
SP Service Provider
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
WCED World Commission Environment and Development
WCL Wireless Commons License
TABLE II: Terminology used throughout the paper.
B. Business actors
Business actors are determined in accordance with the network
infrastructure layers [19],[48],[26],[62]. They are typically providers
of the network’s equipment and services. Telecom operators and
private companies, public authorities, local cooperatives and housing
associations, are some characteristic examples of business actors.
In detail, the physical infrastructure provider (PIP) has
ownership of the passive equipment and undertakes the equipment’s
maintenance and operation responsibilities. PIPs can be divided
into backbone PIPs and access area PIPs, depending on which
network parts they possess. Backbone PIPs invest in the backbone
network infrastructure, while access area PIPs own and moderate
the infrastructure aimed for providing connections to the end users
i.e., first-mile connectivity. In the case of CNs, a local organization
may participate as a backbone PIP, an access PIP or both.
The network provider (NP) owns and operates the active
equipment. It leases physical infrastructure installations from the
PIPs and makes its equipment available for the provision of services
by other SPs or provides its own services. Network providers may
be public authorities, private companies, local cooperatives who
own the equipment or entities who are subcontracted to operate
them by one of the aforementioned owner entities.
The service provider offers services within the network. Service
providers are typically companies that utilize the network’s active
and passive equipment to offer their services to end users in ex-
change for compensation, typically payment. The payment can be di-
rect (service fee) or indirect (connection or network fee). They need
access to the NP’s interface and install their own devices if and where
needed. The existence of service provision within the network is vital
for the end user engagement and therefore the network’s viability.
C. Network Infrastructures Business Models
The roles and responsibilities of different business actors in
network infrastructures vary resulting in a great range of business
models (Fig. 3). Traditional telecom models follow the concept of
vertical integration. In these models, the ownership and operation
of all three infrastructure layers is concentrated to one single entity.
As a consequence, cases of monopolies or oligopolies that hamper
the existence of competitors by exercising great control over the
market, i.e., ”market failure” cases, are common. Moreover, due to
lack of other competing entities, a single vertical integrated operator
is often not willing to provide broadband access to remote areas
featuring high network expansion costs, leaving several rural areas
under-served.
To reverse this picture, the ITU [19],[33] and the EC have set
a goal to promote infrastructure separation and sharing through
legislation, regulation and subsidies. Open access networks have
been brought to focus.
The openness of a network is characterized by the presence of
multiple providers in the market offering customers the opportunity
to choose amongst them. Open access network models separate
the ownership of the business actors from the infrastructure layers
i.e., PIP, NP, SP, with the aim of promoting competition, sharing
of the network infrastructure and discouraging vertical integration.
The following cases can be distinguished although the limits
among the respective actors are not always clearcut.
PIP – Physical Infrastructure Provider
NP – Network Provider
SP – Service Provider
LLUB – Local Loop Unbundling (Forzati 2010)
CPR
SP SP CSCS
CN
CPR – Common Pool Resource
CS – Community service
Fig. 3: The components of a broadband network (with a focus on
optical fibre) and the three service layers.
The different models differ in the functional separation across
layers, as recommended by ITU [33], ranging from vertical
integration across all layers in e, f, g, partial separation in a, b,
d, and full functional separation in c. The models also differ in
terms of alternatives and therefore competition in each layer, except
the passive infrastructure, that tend to a single actor in charge of
deploying and operating either the backbone or the access area PIP.
While all models except g offer alternatives in service provision,
only d, e provide alternatives in network provision.
Diverse types of local cooperative schemes fit and build on
these cases. Municipal networks focus on maximizing the access to
connectivity from public (municipal) interest, and they usually rely
on public-private partnerships. The service is defined and governed
by the public partner but implemented and operated by one or
5multiple private partners. Typical cases the optical fibre service
from Stokab in the Stockholm region, among several other regions
in Europe, following the d model, or the public WiFi services
in most European cities, that can follow any model for service
provision, as the public entity just defines, funds and oversees the
public service under private operation. Internet eXchange Points
(IXP) are physical infrastructure through which Internet service
providers (ISPs) and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) exchange
Internet traffic between their networks (autonomous systems). The
switching infrastructure is built and managed as a CPR according
to Fig.3, but the governance may range from a centralized a to
a participatory CN model. IXPs and CNs are quite equivalent,
the main difference being that IXPs connect larger entities only
(wholesale) and CNs focus on individuals and households (retail).
However the difference blurs as they expand, with the example of
guifi.net that is both a CN and a de-facto regional IXP, or the case
of Ninux, that acts like a country IXP of diverse city or regional
networks, and connected to the Rome IXP (Namex).
D. CNs as open access network instances: the commons model
CNs differ from other models in that there is crowdsourcing in all
layers. The community participants contribute and share the passive
infrastructure, they also coordinate and operate the active network,
and multiple service providers can benefit from that network infras-
tructure CPR. Furthermore, CNs embody some key principles [6]:
Non-discriminatory and open access. The access is non-
discriminatory because any pricing, when practiced, is determined
using a cooperative, rather than competitive, model. Typically this
results in a cost-oriented model (vs. market-oriented) applying
the fair-trade principle for labour pricing [47]. It is open because
everybody has the right to join the infrastructure.
Open participation. Everybody has the right to join the
community. According to roles and interests, several main groups
could be identified as stakeholders: i) volunteers interested in aspects
such as neutrality, privacy, independence, creativity, innovation, DIY,
or protection of consumers rights; ii) commercial entities interested
in aspects such as demand, service supply, and stability of operation;
iii) end users (i.e., customers), interested in network access and
service consumption; and iv) public agencies (local or national),
interested in regulating the participation of society and the usage
of public space, and even in satisfying their own telecommunication
needs. Preserving a balance among these or other stakeholders is
desirable, as every group has natural attributions that should not be
delegated or undertaken by any other. It is important to clarify that
not all stakeholders are present in all CNs. For instance, many CNs
object to the participation of commercial entities as this is against
their vision and philosophy (e.g. B4RN).
The model of the CN is based on the concept that the physical
and active equipment are used as a Common Pool Resource (CPR).
Its participants must accept the rules to join the network and
must contribute the required infrastructure to do it (routers, links,
and servers), but they keep the ownership of hardware they have
contributed and the right to withdraw. As a result, the infrastructure
is shared and managed collectively, as a collective good.
Comparing the CN commons model with the aforementioned
models for open access networks:
• the CPR (i.e., participants of the network, legal entity) replaces
the PIP and NP actors;
• the CPR offers access to private service providers (SPs) but
also provides community services (CSs).
Cooperation at the network deployment and operation level is
crucial but competition in the service provision is encouraged to
avoid monopoly situations.
An example of the commons model in action is provided by the
guifi.net CN. The network employs cost sharing and compensation
mechanisms in order to facilitate the participation of commercial
SPs and operators in the CN. They deliver their services through the
network’s infrastructure and receive payment from their customers.
At the same time, they can contribute infrastructure and invest
money to the CPR or compensate the network for using it [5].
III. CN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE SUSTAINABILITY QUESTION
Sustainability is a multifaceted concept used to study a variety
of systems such as technical, biological and socio-cultural ones.
Its precise definition depends on the system of interest. In general,
the sustainability challenge consists in understanding the way that
a system can smoothly operate in the present and develop in the
future. Hence, sustainability is not a specific goal per se but a
continuous process to reach a goal. Although, originally the term
was used in an environmental context (United Nations World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 1987),
it more recently acquired broader social and economical semantics
(World Summit on Social Development, 2005).
Equally broad is the context of sustainability in the case of com-
munity networks, which are by definition complex socio-technical
systems. Contrary to the commercial production communication net-
works, their existence per se is conditioned on the sustained and ac-
tive participation of all its stakeholders, who contribute resources and
generate value for it. Therefore, a sustainable network should first
of all ensure that all these actors, primarily end users, but also com-
mercial service providers and public organizations when they are
present, have proper commitments and incentives to contribute to the
network. This is not a trivial task since the participation of each actor
is driven by different types of motives and aspirations, including eco-
nomical, socio-cultural, and political ones. Hence, the network needs
to put in place mechanisms, limits and incentive mechanisms to
properly address these aspirations, as in any commons regime [52].
The success of the CN to attract a critical mass of actors also
determines the funding alternatives of a CN. A sustainable funding
model, which will ensure the network capability to cover its
deployment and maintenance expenses, is a crucial parameter for
its long-term viability.
We review the practices of different CNs with respect to funding
in section IV. In the remainder of this section, we describe the
broadly varying motives met across and within the different actors
in a CN. Then, in section V, we describe how different CNs respond
to these motives.
A. Volunteers
In the context of CNs, volunteers are the people who initiate the
CN project. More often than not, (a subset of) these people take
an active role in the network expansion, either through helping with
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the technical matters and/or organizing informational and training
events for potential participants [8].
The volunteer groups usually comprise of people that cumula-
tively possess knowledge and expertise over a wide set of areas, in-
cluding technical, legal, and finance matters [2]: technology enthusi-
asts, radio amateurs, hackers, (social media) activists, and academics.
It is not uncommon for volunteers to create a legal entity (Fig. 4) to
represent the network to third parties (i.e., government, third party or-
ganizations, companies, Internet Service Providers (ISPs)). This lets
them have a voice and interface with third parties on legal and reg-
ulatory matters, but also get involved in financial transactions (e.g.,
collecting user subscriptions, fund raising, purchase of equipment).
Their motives have a strong bias towards political and socio-
cultural values and ideals, which is not met in any of the other
three stakeholder groups. Experimentation with technology, open
software and do-it-yourself (DIY) tools, sensitivity to privacy
and network neutrality, the desire to bridge the digital divide, but
also commitment to the community spirit and social movement,
participatory governance and decision-making, and protection of
consumers’ rights, count as primary reasons for their involvement in
CN initiatives. Economic motivations are much rarer; on the contrary,
the members of the volunteers’ groups usually end up investing a
lot of personal effort, time, and money to the CN initiative, without
direct financial return of any kind. More specifically:
1) Socio-Economic motives: Socio-cultural motives often stand
behind the original conception and deployment of CNs.
Bridging the digital divide: The right to (broadband)
connectivity is a matter of equal opportunities in the contemporary
digital society; and digital illiteracy puts at disadvantage populations
deprived of it. The launch of CN initiatives has many times been
the response to poor or non-existent access to the Internet and
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) services. This is
typically the case with remote, sparsely populated rural areas, where
commercial operators are reluctant to invest on fixed broadband
infrastructure because they do not deem this cost-efficient.
The initial volunteers’ group comes typically from local residents
suffering the digital divide (as the case is with the B4RN [30] and
guifi networks [48]). However help may come from outside. In
the case of the Sarantaporo.gr network, in Greece, the CN came
out of the efforts of a small group of people living in Athens and
abroad, with origins from the Sarantaporo area, by the time that
no broadband access alternative was available there. Likewise, the
i4Free network in an island with poor Internet connectivity close
to the town of Nafpaktos, in Greece, started from the initiative of
a German engineer and professor. He created a small network at his
own expenses so that locals could have access to ICT services [48],
[30], [46]. In a similar scenario, Peter Bloom, an American national,
founded Rhizomatica to promote mobile-phone based services in
the rural area of Oaxaca, Mexico [58].
Economic incentives: these are in a sense relevant whenever a
CN is set up in pursuit of cheaper (affordable) Internet access. In
these cases, the underlying idea is how to expand coverage of the
service, ensure its sustainability and sovereignty from commercial
decisions, and save money with CNs compared to commercial
alternatives rather than how to make money out of the CN initiative.
Therefore, in remote, sparsely populated areas, such as the rural
areas addressed by the B4RN initiative, the competing alternatives,
where they exist, such as satellite or cellular, are typically more
expensive and of lower quality. B4RN was conceived also as a
way to offer better connections at more affordable prices than its
competitors, again in areas where these exist.
Another case, this time in urban environment, is the Consume
network in East London, UK, one of the very first CN initiatives
in Europe. James Stevens ran a technology incubation business
offering web, live streaming and video distribution services through
a leased optic fiber connection. He came up with the idea to
connect buildings through wireless mesh links as a way to bypass
the expensive license costs and regulatory constraints related to
expanding the fiber communication across the buildings.
2) Political motives: Political causes often serve as driving forces
for the groups that lead CN initiatives. Such causes often prove to
be strong enough to fuel these groups’ active involvement with the
CN despite the effort, time and money this requires. They include:
Openness, net neutrality, and privacy: These highly
controversial issues have served as primary motivations for CN
initiatives. The principle of net neutrality dictates that traffic within
the network should be treated in an equal manner independently
of the type of content or the source. The data communicated across
the network is not subject to discrimination.
A characteristic example of principles underlying the CN
initiatives is found in the declaration by the guifi.net Foundation,
the volunteers’ group that has developed and still operates the guifi
CN, in Catalonia, Spain [55], [7], [51]:
• Freedom to use the network, as long as the other users, the
contents, and the network itself are respected.
• Freedom to learn the working details of network elements and
the network as a whole.
• Freedom to disseminate the knowledge and the spirit of the
network.
• Freedom to offer services and contents.
Moreover, volunteers are often interested in accessing ICT services
without having to compromise their privacy. This applies for
technology enthusiasts, activists and users in general that wish to
protect their private content. CNs such as the French FFDN and
the German Freifunk declare privacy/anonymity and net neutrality
7as integral parts of their manifesto and incorporate them in their
fundamental operation principles.
Autonomy and alternative communicationmodels: These are
common motives for the original deployment and subsequent
operation of CNs [37], especially in urban areas, where the digital
divide threat is much less pronounced. Community networks such
as Consume34 and Free2Air56 started out representing alternative
approaches to the commercial Internet provision, aiming at higher
freedom and control over personal communications. In other cases,
such as guifi.net, which started as an attempt to bridge the digital
divide, such political purposes emerged as an equally strong motivat-
ing factor, especially when the number of network connectivity al-
ternatives increased. Rhizomatica founder goals were both to bridge
the digital divide and to create an alternate telecommunications
network where people could communicate with costs much lower
than the existing telecom solutions in the area (where they existed).
3) Socio-cultural motives: Socio-cultural motives often stand
behind the original conception and deployment of CNs. Among
the main ones count:
Experimentation with technology and DIY culture: Several
initiatives are driven by hackers, technology enthusiasts, and
academics who enjoy experimenting with network and radio
technologies. The involvement within such a community presents
them with a unique opportunity to further enhance their technical
knowledge and practice it over real networks.
The AWMN, Ninux, and Freifunk CNs were initiated and are
still run by network technicians and computer enthusiasts. As such,
they have been characterized by a culture of experimentation and
improvisation. AWMN and Ninux, in particular are used by their vol-
unteers as testbeds for manufacturing equipment (antennas, feeders)
and experimenting with routing protocols and applications. This is
evidenced also in the impressive number of native applications and
services that were developed for AWMN, without need for public
Internet connectivity, including games, libraries, network monitoring
tools, DNS solutions, and experimental platforms. Notably, neither
AWMN nor Ninux, whose initials stand for ”No Internet, Network
Under eXperiment”, nominally provide Internet access.
Community spirit and altruism: Altruism, often coupled with
a strong commitment to community ideals serve as important
motivations for the active involvement of volunteers’ groups in CNs.
Both are strongly evidenced in the B4RN, Sarantaporo.gr and
i4Free CN initiatives. Community activists have been among the
leading figures in B4RN and have set it up as a community benefit
society which can never be bought by a commercial operator and its
profits can only be distributed to the community. Likewise, the Saran-
taporo.gr non-profit organization involves people who are activists
in the area of commons and supporters of community ideals. They
place a lot of emphasis on cultivating these ideals in the residents of
the area with parallel activities and social events. Finally, the leading
figure behind the i4Free CN, identifies himself as a warm fan of
community life and ideals. He has spent enormous amounts of time
trying to build a community around the CN through training and
educational events, even without much success as he admits [30].
3http://consume.net/
4http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Consume
5http://www.free2air.org/
6http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Free2Air
B. Active participants
Even broader is the variety of reasons for the involvement of
citizens in a community network. Decisive for many of them is the
expectation of available and abundant local connectivity anywhere is
needed. Furthermore there is the expectation of cheaper, or even free,
Internet access and other services provided by commercial entities.
For others, the CN represents a perfect opportunity to acquire new
knowledge and experiment with technologies, and/or socialize and
become part of a bigger community. Activism in favor of higher
autonomy and data privacy are also evidenced as user participation
motives, albeit to a smaller extent than in volunteer groups.
Their levels of participation typical vary a lot within a CN.
Some of them are highly active participating in events organized
by volunteers or other types of collective activities, sharing their
technical experience, developing applications and devoting personal
time and efforts to the CN. On the other extreme, a number of users
that tends to be the majority in most CNs, set up a node and use
the CN to get Internet access or access to local services without
further contributing to the activities of the community. However,
the presence of even these passive users can benefit the network
to the extent that others can join the CN through their nodes.
The CN users may pay a connectivity fee for being part of the CN
or not. These fees contribute to pay the necessary costs to upgrade or
maintain the CN infrastructure. Depending on whether they receive
some service over the CN, they may pay a consumption fee and
maintain a contributor, shareholder or customer relationship with the
CN, directly or indirectly through paying service fees to a commer-
cial service provider acting as intermediary and value-added reseller.
1) Socio-Economic motives: Users often expect benefits of
economic nature from their participation in a CN, both direct and
indirect.
Direct economic benefits:The most usual one is local connectiv-
ity or Internet access that is not offered by other providers, or at lower
cost than alternative solutions, offered by commercial telecom oper-
ators (Table I-B2). A characteristic example, Rhizomatica, has man-
aged to reduce costs by 98% on international (U.S.) calls and 66% on
cellphone calls. Internet connectivity can either be provided by the
CNs themselves, which take on the role of alternative Internet service
providers (e.g., B4RN, Sarantaporo.gr); as an add-on service over the
CN by a third party (e.g., guifi.net, Rhizomatica); or by CN members
who pro bono share their access with other peers (e.g., AWMN).
The collective efforts of the CN participants is often fundamental
for expanding the coverage of the network or lowering the
connectivity cost. For instance, B4RN partially crowdsources the
cost and effort involved in deploying fiber in rural communities
in Northern England. This way, it can offer fiber connectivity and
Internet speed in underserved areas and at more favorable prices
than alternative commercial solutions.
A local infrastructure, locally maintained, feeds the local
economy, creating paid jobs for the deployment, maintenance,
expansion and operation of the network itself and related services
over the network (content and services) or enabled by the network
(telework, remote assistance, surveillance, sensing).
CNs create the opportunity for local investment. Local can
obtain economic benefits from investing in local infrastructures,
particularly more durable fibre infrastructures, that can have good
returns of investment from usage fees, while also giving indirect
8economic benefits by increasing the value of households, typically
the largest investment of a family.
Indirect economic benefits: Participation in a CN may incur
additional benefits to their users. One of them relates to the growth of
human capital and another to the added value that the CN generates
for businesses and professionals participating in it. Examples from
Sarantaporo.gr and AWMN show that young people (in the age of
18-35) view the CNs as a path to information about job and further
education opportunities and to business activities developed around
the CN [30]. Moreover, in remote rural areas, network access
and Internet connectivity can enable professionals to search better
markets for their products and cheaper suppliers for their materials
(e.g., farmers) and small business owners to join the network in the
anticipation that visitors appreciate the Internet connectivity feature
when choosing where to go (e.g., Sarantaporo.gr). Underserved
communities in terms of connectivity tend to suffer from fragility or
lack of other critical infrastructures. The deployment of networking
infrastructures creates economies of sharing and bundling, such
as improvements in electrification, with the introduction of solar
panels, that for instance can enable or improve the quality of
night-time lighting and food preservation, which in turn may create
economic benefits from trading of these products.
2) Political motives: As seen in section III-A2, many CNs
have been initiated under aspirations of privacy, net neutrality, and
alternative models of Internet connectivity provision with strong
flavor of autonomy and self-organization. The ideals underlying the
initial development of these CNs are often inherited by subsequent
users of the CN. However, these users tend to be a small part of
the total CN user population. Typically, the larger the CN grows
the harder it becomes to find political causes that unite the whole
community behind them.
Openness, net neutrality and privacy: The aspects of privacy
and neutrality have a strong role in CNs that utilize the Picopeering
agreement7 as a participation/operations framework and are part
of the movement for open wireless radio networks8 (e.g., Freifunk,
guifi.net, Ninux, FFDN).
The Picopeering agreement is a baseline template formalizing the
interaction between two network peers. It caters for a) an agreement
on free exchange of data; b) an agreement on providence of open
communication by publishing relevant peering information; c) no
service level guarantees; d) users’ formulations of use policies; and
e) local amendments dependent on the will of node owners.
Autonomy and self-organization: The participation in CN
groups cultivates feelings of autonomy and self-organization. Self
organization is practised in the way new users connect to the CN,
where they have to rely on their own resources and the voluntary
assistance of experienced network members. Being part of an
independent network satisfies personal ideological aspirations for
self-organized network and autonomous use [37]. The ability
to participate in collective decision making and contribute to an
alternative ”commons”-based model of ICT access counts itself
as a worthy experience for users with strong ”commons” ideals.
3) Socio-cultural motives: A CN is a characteristic example of
participatory involvement, where users dedicate their efforts and
time to the network [63]. A number of services and applications
7http://www.picopeer.net/PPA-en.shtml
8https://openwireless.org/.
combined with other activities that one way or another revolve
around the CN, offer users the opportunity to communicate, educate
and entertain themselves, thus further motivating their participation
in the network [62], [54].
Experimentation and training with ICT: Technology
enthusiasts participate in the network for experimenting with the
technology i.e., trying software they develop and hacked code,
make network speed measurements, play with network mapping
and management tools [37]. Users can acquire new skills about
computer and network use, i.e., either through self-experimentation
or through training by network experts.
In CNs initiated by volunteers with technical background
(e.g., AWMN, Ninux, Freifunk), the amount and type of services,
applications and self-produced software increased greatly within the
community. Besides a variety of network monitoring tools, users
can enjoy communication services such as VoIP, online forums,
mails, and instant messaging; data exchange services with servers,
community clouds and file sharing systems; entertainment services
with gaming applications and audio/video broadcasting tools;
information and educating services with online seminars, e-learning
platforms, and wikis.
Desire for social interaction: The smooth operation and
development of a CN demands cooperation links at the network
infrastructure level but also at the social level. In CNs, participants
are able to share their ideas and interests, participate in groups,
interact and communicate with other network members just like they
would in any other online or physical community. Social networking
and communication tools raise great interest and remain active even
when other tools and services have a drop in their utilization.
The importance of local relationships in a CN [36] is also
evidenced in three independent studies addressing a rural village
in Zambia [34], the TakNet CN, in the rural area of northern
Thailand [38], as well as Australian and Greek CNs in [37]. In this
last study, 91.2% of the users stated that they enjoyed interacting
with the community, 88% felt that their efforts would be returned by
other community members and 80.5% expressed that the community
allowed them to work with people that they could trust and share sim-
ilar interests. Likewise, in the case of TakNet, much of the activity
among users of the popular applications such as messaging, email,
online social networks and gaming, exhibits a high degree of locality,
i.e., people use Internet to interact with people within the same CN.
Socio-psychological motives: As social motives count socially-
aware mechanisms that relate to concepts such as visibility, acknowl-
edgment, social approval, individual privileges and status. This
social activity is applied within the networks’ technical limits [44].
The ability to compete with other people and satisfy one’s self
esteem through the involvement in the community, or receive a
certain type of credit by others in the community, are motives not as
easy to distinguish but still present [37], [38], [34], [35] and with
an impact on network growth and operation [61], [10].
C. Private sector service providers
Private sector service providers form the stakeholder type that
may be less involved in CN initiatives. The term points to companies,
ISPs, small businesses or individuals, namely entities that support or
use the network to provide some service and get compensated for it.
These can be a) the professionals that are involved in the installation,
9CN Legal form Funding
AWMN AWMN Foundation Members (individually)
B4RN Community Benefit Society Members
Consume None Central actors
FFDN Non-Profit Organization Members, Local authorities, Donations
Free2Air Incorporated Legal Company Members
Freifunk Non-Profit Organization Members, Public Institutions
Funkfeuer None Members
guifi.net Guifi.net Foundation Members
i4Free None Central actor
Ninux None Members
Rhizomatica Non-Profit Organization
Members, National and International
organizations, Donations
Sarantaporo.gr Non-Profit Organization Members, European Union, Donations
TakNET Social enterprise - Net2home
Members, Private Insitutions, THNIC
Foundation, European Union
Wireless Leiden Non-Profit Organization Members, Public/Private Institutions
Zenzeleni.net Formal Network/Telecom Operator Members, Public Institutions
TABLE III: CN specific organizational aspects.
operation and maintenance of the CPR network infrastructure, or
b) the organizations that provide content or services inside the CN.
At first glance, these entities do over the CN what they do over
any other network, i.e., provide services where there is demand
for them. However, the legal provisions and conditions of running
business over the CN may be different given the existence of a CPR
infrastructure and the governance and the crowdsourced nature of it.
In fact, the CPR is an enabler of small private sector providers. Since
the network commons is a shared resource, that enables these small
players to operate and provide services over a larger population, with
the economies of scale of cooperative aggregation of CAPEX and
OPEX among multiple participants, and the complementarity and
opportunities of specialization among them. This also means a lower
barrier or entry, with much less initial investment and less risk thanks
to the cooperative, and cost oriented model, of the network commons.
Therefore the network infrastructure commons becomes a critical
resource for the operation and competitiveness of these local private
sector service providers. Therefore the common goal would be
preserving the commons to enable their specific business models.
The incentives for the participation of private sector service
providers in the network are almost always economic. These actors
are interested in profit. The CN provides them with access to
potential customers who would otherwise be unreachable. The
implementation of their commercial activities depends on the
organizational nature of the CN. Guifi.net has set up a framework
that enables the participation of private sector in its CN, including
maintainers, installers, ISP providers, VoIP providers (Table III-C).
These entities may sign agreements with the guifi.net Foundation,
when the service provision has to do with the sustainability of
the CPR. External Over-The-Top (OTT) services, such as Internet
VOIP, Video, content providers are left outside. In Rhizomatica,
ISPs and VOIP providers are key partners of the organization.
Rhizomatica provides the Radio Access Network through which the
service providers reach the local communities and their CN users.
D. Public agencies
Public agencies have the natural role of regulating the public
space, either for service provision, occupation of public spectrum,
public land, but also supporting local development and ensuring ac-
cess rights to public information and services. Public agencies have
a responsibility to regulate the deployment and service provision of
CNs, as with any other entity performing these activities. Further-
more, they may cooperate with a CN when the mission of both align.
They may contribute to its deployment and growth through funding
the initiative, sponsoring network equipment, consuming CN ser-
vices, facilitating its expansion and growth or by permitting the use
of public space and resources by a CN. In Catalonia, the Foundation
operating guifi.net has developed the Universal format [50], a
template municipal ordinance, that allows municipalities to regulate
public, commercial and community entities to deploy shared
infrastructures in public space. Under these principles, several local
authorities have allowed guifi.net groups to dig public space and
lay down fiber for expanding the network. In several German cities,
Freifunk is given the permission to set up antennas and equipment
in the roof top of churches, Town Halls, or other public buildings.
Quite often other types of public agencies get involved in the
network. Sarantaporo.gr has received network equipment for
the initial deployment by the Greek Foundation for open-source
software and Internet connectivity from the regional University
of Applied Sciences. TakNet received financial support from the
Thai Network Information Centre Foundation and initial equipment
donation and support from the Network Startup Resource Centre.
Depending on their level of participation public agencies can
sign collaboration agreements with the legal entity of the CN and
contribute economic or infrastructure resources with or without
compensation.
1) Socio-economic motives: The participation of public agencies
in a CN initiative can also have an economic motivation. In the
case of guifi.net public agencies can fund the network expansion
through purchase of equipment in return for complimentary added
value services over the CN. Public agencies may be interested in
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Services Private sector providers
Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Adit Slu, Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom, Emporda
Wifi - Guifi.net a l’Alt Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Pangea.org,
Priona.net, S.G. Electronics, Steitec-Servei Te`cnic d’Electronica i Telecomunicacions, Ticae,
Xartic
Mobile Provider
Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Ebrecom, Emporda Wifi - Guifi.net al Alt Emporda,
Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Priona.net, S.G.Electronics, Ticae
Surveillance
Ballus Informatica S.L., Capa8, Delanit, Ebrecom, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Matwifi, S.G.
Electronics, Ticae
Telephony (VoIP) Provider
Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom, Emporda Wifi
- Guifi.net a l’Alt Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Matwifi,
Priona.net, S.G. Electronics, Ticae
TV (IpTv) Provider Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Priona.net
Agreement types Service providers
Economic Activity Agreement Adit Slu, Asociacion SevillaGuifi, Associacio Guifinet la Bisbal d’Emporda, Ballus Informatica,
Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom, Emporda Wifi - Guifi.net al Alt
Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Ion Alejos Garizabal, Maider
Likona, Matwifi, Pangea.org, Priona.net, S.G.Electronics, Steitec- Servei Tecnin d’Electronica
I Telecomunicacions, Ticae, Xartic
Volunteer Agreement Cittec, Girona Fibra, Matwifi
TABLE IV: Private sector service providers in guifi.net and the services they provide.
the added value of purchasing connectivity services from a CPR
infrastructure, as while being competitive in price, can amplify
the spill-over effects in the local economy, and contribute to
socio-economic development. However, public entities may also be
tempted to put obstacles as a result of the influence and pressure of
traditional large telecom companies, with more taxation than large
telecom or Internet players that may enjoy unfair tax benefits.
2) Political motives: The participation of public agencies in a CN
often comes as a result of high-level policies against the digital di-
vide, to increase the offer or lower the costs of local connectivity, and
in favor of equal opportunities in the digital economy and society.
3) Socio-cultural motives: Public agencies may also support
CNs because they acknowledge their long-term potential to
strengthen the community links, raise awareness for issues
concerning the local societies and favor the engagement of citizens
with the commons. On the polar opposite and more opportunistic
note, local administrations (such as municipalities) can advertise
the provision of network services as a political achievement that
increases their re-election chances.
IV. FUNDING SOURCES FOR CNS
CNs use one or more of the following ways (Table III-B3) to
fund their activities [4]:
A. Member subscriptions and contributions in kind
This is the most common funding model for CNs. In this case, the
members of the CN contribute network equipment and time/effort to
the network growth and maintenance. In the case of the BARN net-
work, which provides fibre connectivity, members even contributed
digging effort. In most cases, the CN users pay a monthly/annual
subscription fee for the CN needs. Several CNs such as AWMN
in Greece, Ninux.net in Italy, BARN in UK, and Freifunk.net in
Germany, have managed to scale significantly this way.
Despite its simplicity, the model has several variations.
Subscriptions may be mandatory or voluntary; or they may serve as
a prerequisite for participation in decision-making bodies and voting
rights. In the case of the Sarantaporo.gr, it is villages under the
network coverage, rather than individual CN users, that are charged
with a fee. How each village will split the cost among local users
is left to the the CN participants in that specific village to define.
What the CN users get in return for their subscriptions is closely
related to the way the CN organizes itself and positions in the
telecommunications arena. For example, B4RN operates as a
community benefit society, which provides Internet service to its
subscribers. The subscription model is composed of a connectivity
fee and different service fees for different types of users. On a similar
note, Zenzeleni.net operates as a cooperative telecommunications
operator providing voice and data services to its customers. TakNet
has developed a social enterprise called Net2Home. Users have to
pay monthly fees that are used for covering fiber (to the network
operator), maintenance, equipment installation, technical online
support, network management and monitoring costs. Rhizomatica
helps communities in Mexico build their networks receives a flat
rate for equipment installation and community member training as
well as a percentage of monthly subscription, advisory and technical
services fees. Finally, but far more rarely, a CN may operate as
a for-profit company. Some of the FFDN networks in France are
commercial networks that indeed rely on policies such as standard
pay-per-use contracts and added value services to customers
outside the CN. However, in contrast with traditional commercial
companies that extract profit from customers and locals to retribute
investors, CNs reinvest the profits in the CPR infrastructure.
B. Donations from supporters
Community Networks are often financed through crowd-funding
projects or direct, regular or one-time, donations. In some CNs,
citizens can invest in the infrastructure, either for a specific reason
such as crowdfunding the construction or improvement of a critical
link that affects the user (typical in guifi.net), or generic, through
community shares to expand the local network or even his home
access (in B4RN). These investments can generate tax returns
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(guifi.net Foundation or B4RN). In B4RN this investment also
generates (3%) interest after the third year. In developing areas
or in disaster situations external donors can contribute funds such
as in Zenzeleni (ZA), Rhizomatica and Nepal Wireless (NP). This
funding source typically complements other funding sources since
it rarely suffices to cover the CN’s funding needs.
C. Support from public agencies and institutions
There are cases, where CN initiatives have got generous support
from public funds (cash or in kind). Municipalities and local
authorities emerge as main actors in this respect. The synergy of
commons/public service with civil society/municipality can limit
the survival concerns of CNs as far as one finds sustainable models
that motivate their cooperation [25], [57],[56].
One such case is the Sarantaporo.gr CN, which set up its first
nodes with hardware and equipment received from the Greek
Free/Open source Software Society (GFOSS); and, later, expanded
the CN through funding by the CONFINE project [11], funded
by the European Commission. Likewise, in the case of Freifunk,
the support from public authorities was expressed through making
available public buildings such as churches or Town Halls for
placing and storing the network’s equipment (e.g., antennas).
Sometimes, the support may be expressed in more indirect, yet
equally significant, ways such as giving proper attention to CNs
in regulatory actions. The guifi.net Foundation has developed a
cooperative infrastructure sharing model (the Universal deployment
model) that develops over the Directive 2014/61/CE on broadband
cost reduction of the EU9 and the infrastructure sharing concept of
the ITU10. The model prescribes how municipalities and counties
can regulate the use of public space by private, government and civil
society in a sustainable manner [50]. Rhizomatica has expressed
interest in following a compensation system such as the one used
in guifi.net [58].
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Fig. 5: Radar chart with CN funding entities in a 0-3 scale. CN
funding sources. 0: mainly private entities’ involvement, 1: mainly
public agencies’ involvement, small scale member contribution
2: mainly member contribution (donations, non regular fees), 3:
member contribution only (regular fees).
9https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
factsheets-directive-201461ce-broadband-cost-reduction
10https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/Trends08 exec A5-e.pdf
D. Funding from private sector through commons-based policies
In the case of guifi.net, CNs have come up with unique innovative
models combining voluntary and professional services into a
commons-based approach. Commercial service providers offer
services over the CN and charge the CN users as typical customers,
but also subsidize the CN growth and maintenance subscribing to
the commons policies. This way, the CN maintains its non-profit
orientation and pursues its sustainability through synergies with
entities undertaking commercial for-profit activities [5].
When assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the four
categories of funding sources, the following remarks are due:
• Some sources (i.e., donations, voluntary contributions etc.)
are one way or another not guaranteed and they make
long-term strategic planning difficult. They could also lead to
disagreements and conflicts between CN members concerning
their distribution inside the network, especially if there are not
well-defined decision-making processes.
• Unless something dramatically changes on the regulation
side, the support of public authorities for CNs cannot be
taken for granted. BARN is one CN instance that tried to
access national funding without success (their bid for the
funding was eventually withdrawn). In the case of guifi.net,
the municipality of Barcelona is reluctant to provide the CN
with access to the city wi-fi and fiber infrastructure. In general,
CNs tend to view access to local, national or European funds
too difficult as well as demanding, uncertain, and bureaucratic.
• The dominant view across CN initiatives is that the funding
from own resources is the most reliable and favorable option.
BARN and Freifunk, two of the three networks in Europe
that have managed to scale in the order of tens of thousands
of nodes, have followed this approach.
• Trying to put commercial service providers in the loop while
preserving the CN ideals, as guifi.net does, definitely represents
an innovative approach. The success it experiences in the case
of the guifi network renders it a valid funding model alternative.
Interestingly, only guifi.net so far has managed to involve in its
funding model all possible actors (end users/members, private
sector and public authorities). Striking the right balance between
the roles and contribution modes of these three parts may prove
the key towards the economic sustainability of CN initiatives.
Fig. 5 summarizes the funding dependencies on different sources
for the 15 CNs. Member contributions, public or private institutions,
public authorities, contests and funding projects are met in different
scales within each CN and provide part (or all) of the network’s
resources. Some CNs operate through regular economic contri-
butions of their members in commercialized subscription models
(B4RN, Zenzeleni.net, FFDN, Rhizomatica) while others adhere to
non regular fees usually gathered in the form of donations by their
members (AWMN, Freifunk, Funkfeuer). In cases where the contri-
butions by a CN’s own members are not systematic, public fundings
(Sarantaporo.gr, TakNET) pose a significant aid and private entity
involvement contributes to the economic activity of the CN (i4Free,
guifi.net, Wireless Leiden). The involvement of private entities varies
among a single person’s funding met in i4Free, ISP’s offering their
services and contributing to the ecosystem of the CN in guifi.net, or
private and public funding by institutions in Wireless Leiden.
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V. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN CNS
To ensure a sustainable presence, CNs have put in place diverse
incentive mechanisms. As with other types of commons [52], the
main purpose of these mechanisms is to limit, encourage and fuel
the original motives for participation of all types of actors. They
also aim to prevent phenomena and conditions that might weaken
the original motivation of actors. Such phenomena include mainly:
Free riding and selfish behaviors:many users are solely interested
in enjoying network connectivity without themselves contributing
adequate or any resources to the CN. Such behaviors can easily lead
to the depletion of network resources and CN degradation. Mech-
anisms for organizing and ensuring users sustained contributions
and distributing effort across them are of significant importance.
Unclear CN legal status: CN actors (users or private sector
entities) may be deterred from joining the network and participating
in its activities if its legal status is not clear. Well established
operational and participation rules can alleviate such effects.
In what follows, we review incentive mechanisms that are either in
place in different CNs or have been proposed, without (yet) finding a
path to implementation, in the literature. In the latter context, we also
review mechanisms that have been proposed for similar systems
such as wireless ad-hoc networks, P2P systems, and virtual online
communities. These systems display inherent structural similarities
with CNs in that they also depend on the collective effort and coop-
eration of their participants to fulfill their tasks: forward and route
data in wireless ad hoc networks, disseminate files and other data
in P2P systems, share effort and data in virtual online communities.
The different incentive mechanisms aiming to motivate the
participation in CNs and strengthen their sustainability are grouped
into six categories (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6: Categories of incentive mechanisms used in CNs.
A. Enforcing fairness in users’ contributions and interactions
Despite the direct threat that free riding phenomena pose
to the network’s long-term sustainability, actual prevention
countermeasures are not that widespread in most CNs, with the
notable exception of guifi.net [6]. Interestingly, a quite broad range
of solutions have been proposed in the literature, either in the
specific context of CNs or that of similar systems (wireless ad-hoc,
P2P, and online virtual communities) [32], [15].
1) Direct reciprocity-based mechanisms: Reciprocity is a broad
term that incorporates the notion of human cooperation in different
interaction scenarios [49]. Direct reciprocity keeps records of the
interaction of two specific individuals so that the accounts are
settled between those two. The ”tit-for-tat” manner of connecting
to wireless CNs is quite common practice between their members.
For a node to connect to a CN, there must be another node to which
the connection is directed. In many cases, the reciprocal sharing
obligations stemming from the participation in the CN, are explicitly
described in licenses such as the Wireless Commons License
(WCL)[6]11 defined in terms of neutrality and general reciprocation.
Direct reciprocity mechanisms can be described in various
contexts such as in sharing network connectivity or storage and
computing resources. The compensation tables in guifi.net is a
key resource to ensure the economic sustainability of the network,
ensuring a cooperative and cost-oriented model to share the recurring
costs and balance investment, maintenance and consumption [5].
In terms of proposals, connectivity sharing is the objective
studied in [18]. A reciprocity algorithm, coupled with the P2PWNC
protocol in [17], keeps account of the services each participant
provides and consumes via technical receipts. This way, it keeps
a balance between the amount of traffic users transfer and
that they relay on behalf of others. The model considers the
provision of Internet access through the APs of a wireless CN.
Participants are divided into teams that manage their own APs and
consume/contribute traffic of/to another AP.
Reciprocity-based mechanisms for sharing storage and
computing resources are reported in [14], [13] and [64]. In [14]
and [13], the reciprocity-based mechanism is implemented over
a Community Cloud made out of shared computational resources of
the network members and is based on records of participants’ efforts.
Results indicate that the most suitable structure for community
clouds should distinguish between ordinary nodes that possess
cloud resources and super nodes that are responsible for the
management of resource sharing. In [64], mobile devices used for
computing, borrow CPU slots in a reciprocal manner. It is suggested
that the heterogeneity in the amount of available resources may not
be beneficial for participants with large-scale resources.
2) Indirect reciprocity-based mechanisms: The concept of direct
reciprocity readily expands to that of indirect reciprocity, which is
essentially realized by reputation mechanisms. Indirect reciprocity
does not consider two specific individuals (like direct reciprocity)
but rather asymmetric random exchanges based on the reputation
scores of each individual node. Key issues in building reputation
mechanisms [12], involve keeping past behavior records (as node
reputation is partially built over time), carefully evaluating all of
the acquired information and distinguishing between old data vs
recently gathered ones. Among other challenges, reputation-based
systems have to face the impact of liars on peer reputation i.e.,
nodes giving unreliable information about other nodes. The system
should be able to yield immediate response to known misbehaving
nodes by drawing from past information.
The guifi.net classification of suppliers12 (professionals,
volunteers) provides a public ranked list according to reputation
of professionals and volunteers available for a range of tasks. The
list is based on the certification of their abilities based on actual
deployments or training courses.
11http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Wireless Commons License
12https://guifi.net/en/node/3671/suppliers
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Reputation mechanisms have been proposed for P2P systems and
wireless ad-hoc networks. In [59], such a mechanism is developed
to build a reputation score for P2P system participants. Each peer
is described based on how much service (bandwidth, computation)
it provides and consumes. Peers are encouraged to collaborate with
each other and receive an increase in their reputation metrics. The
mechanism successfully results in peers making coalitions that
eventually work to their benefit. In a similar rationale for routing in
mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), the reputation technique aims
at isolating non-cooperative node behavior using the Confidant
protocol. The tamper-proof hardware, which is embedded in nodes,
keeps account of their virtual credit collected as they contribute in
packet forwarding. The reputation mechanism in [45] keeps records
of the collaboration activities of nodes in the MANET and builds
a reputation score for each node, based on monitored collaboration
data and information input from other nodes.
3) Punishment of free-riders: Free riding is a quite common prob-
lem in commons, experienced in various forms by each network type.
The design of long-enduring CPR institutions [52] requires gradu-
ated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect community rules.
This implies defining the “boundaries”, determined by the
community license and agreements, and requires effective conflict
resolution methods that may include sanctions [6]. The conflicts
resolution system in guifi.net provides a systematic and clear
procedure for resolution of conflicts with participants that negatively
affect the common infrastructure resource, with a scale of graduated
sanctions. It consists of three stages -conciliation, mediation, and
arbitration- all of them driven by a lawyer chosen from a set of
volunteers. This has been found critical to keep the infrastructure
and the project itself operational.
In multi-hop wireless networks, consumption of bandwidth and
energy serve as the main motivations for nodes’ free riding behavior.
Nodes enjoy packet forwarding of their own packets by other
nodes but defer, either deterministically or probabilistically, from
forwarding the packet of other nodes. Detection and punishment
of suspected free-riding nodes are the two basic steps suggested
for dealing with this phenomenon in the corresponding literature.
In the generic setting in [53], it is suggested that free riding
should be confronted using exclusion of peers from a group as a
plausible threat. Misbehaving nodes are detected through reputation
protocols and excluded from the network or community. Detection
of selfish behaviors of mesh routing nodes is carried out in [43]
with a trust-based mechanism. The mechanism can be developed
based on the combined observations of neighbor (and other) nodes
of the CN such as in KDet [39]. The Catch protocol in [41], tries to
limit the free riding problem in multi-hop wireless networks while
preserving anonymity. The adopted technique uses anonymous
messages and statistical tests to detect the selfishly behaving nodes
and isolate them. It relies on the assumption that free-riding does
not appear in the initial stages of the network deployment but later,
as the number of peers starts to grow. The corresponding example
in CNs reflects the fact that the initial members, i.e., volunteers,
create the CNs based on certain principles and knowledge that are
not compatible with free riding practice. Members that join the
network in subsequent stages, i.e., users, are often not acquainted
with these principles and the importance of complying to them.
4) Direct and indirect financial compensation: This type of
mechanisms aim to support CNs’ economic sustainability. Guifi.net,
a representative example of this category, involves private sector
actors that provide commercial services in the CN. To this end, it
has set forth additional mechanisms for compensating contributions
of different stakeholders i.e., compensation system, provision of
donation certificates [5].
The compensation system aims at settling imbalances between
network usage and contributions (CAPEX or OPEX). It is a way
for participating entities to share network costs while acquiring
network resources. Private sector service providers may assume
the roles of operators that contribute to the network and consume
its resources, investors that only contribute, and pure operators that
only consume network resources. Operators can contribute either
to the deployment of the infrastructure or to its maintenance.
The provision of donation certificates that are amenable to tax
deductions, is a way of acquiring indirect benefits for contributing
to a commons infrastructure. Users who pay commercial service
providers for service provision, can have some tax deduction
benefits as well according to the Spanish legislation and regulation
authorities.
Other mechanisms explored in the literature but not yet validated
in CNs are the following.
5) Community currencies: The design of community currencies
is a way to enforce reciprocity and balance the contributions of nodes
to the network. As long as the cost/value of nodes’ contribution can
be quantified, community currencies can ease the exchange of a
wider set of services between CN members and users of a CN and
properly reward voluntary activities. At the same time, community
currencies are themselves collaborative activities that increase
the community spirit and strengthen the intrinsic motivations for
participating in a CN. In fact, the smooth operation of a community
currency depends heavily on building trust between community
members both to accept and use the corresponding currency but also
to be able to provide risk-free credits that are very important for the
required flow of currency. This trust is a very important asset that
can play a key role in the initial birth and sustainable operation of
CNs. For the same reason (existing trust and community values), the
existence and operation of a CN eases the launch of a community
currency. The development of community currencies for CNs is
yet at an initial stage but they pose a promising mechanism that
exhibits a complex bidirectional relation with CNs [4].
6) Other game-theoretic mechanisms for enforcing participation:
Participant’s motives for contributing in CNs can be enhanced by
game-theoretic and mechanism design approaches. An incentive
mechanism based on a Stackelberg game is provided in [9]. The
objective is to stimulate user and ISP provider participation in a
hypothesis of a global CN where the participating entities (users
and ISPs) interact with an intermediate entity, i.e., the community
provider or mediator.
Due to the cooperative nature of CNs, participation of peers
often needs to be combined with mutual cooperation i.e.,
forwarding packets, amongst them. While some works use
reputation-based mechanisms there are others that prefer credit as
a plausible economic incentive to sustain participation. The works
in [21], [22], [67] and [66] tackle this objective in different types
of systems i.e., P2P, static or mobile ad-hoc systems.
In a P2P network setting [21], the prisoner’s dilemma is chosen
to design incentive techniques and deal with challenges such as
large populations with small lifetime, asymmetry of interest in
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participation and multiple peer identities. In order to enhance
cooperation and avoid false identities and hijacking, the mechanism
proposes to keep records of peer interaction and use them to build
reputation metrics. In another approach, the work in [22] uses game
theory techniques to enhance cooperation in static ad-hoc networks
and suggests that the most effective incentivizing structure is one
that combines actual incentive mechanisms i.e., actual credits as
reputation systems or virtual currencies, with mechanisms that
target players’ self interest and enjoyment. A Video on Demand
service on wireless ad hoc systems is the setting for the Stackelberg
game presented in [65]. In order to promote cooperation among
participants i.e., upload and forward data, the content provider
offers them rewards which vary across actual payment, virtual
credit or reputation points. A software protocol in [67] combined
with a game-theoretic aspect is used to stimulate cooperation
among selfish nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. A cheat-proof and
credit-based mechanism determines node rewards and costs which
are utilized for packet forwarding and route discovery.
B. Community cloud infrastructure
CN services and applications that store data or process locally
can serve as privacy-related incentive mechanisms for CN
participants avoiding the exposure to not well understood and often
privacy-unfriendly practices of commercial data storage solutions.
More often than not, such services involve the deployment of
distributed cloud solutions that are deployed locally across the CN
nodes, that process and store users’ data without dependence on
external cloud services.
A proposition to extend CN resource sharing beyond bandwidth
resources to computing resources can be found and discussed
in [35]. Cloud computing infrastructures can be developed in
various ways but face severe challenges due to the nature of
CNs i.e., hardware and software diversity with various options
for inexpensive material, decentralized management where users
contribute and manage their own resources and rapid changes in the
number of contributing nodes. The idea of developing a distributed
Community Cloud that follows the topology of CNs is proposed
in [14]. The goal is to regulate consumption and contribution of
participant resources in the community cloud in accordance to
one’s level of contribution. They present an effort-based mechanism
for stimulating node participation in resource sharing. Nodes are
incentivized using rewards that depend upon their contribution, i.e.,
effort to the local cloud system. A Community Cloud can also be
used in conjunction with Grid Computing techniques [42]. The
Community Cloud uses the spare resources of network nodes while
considering environmental sustainability and self-management and
replaces vendor clouds with full access to users’ resources.
C. Socializing processes and tools
CNs have developed a great variety of mechanisms to promote
participation, interaction and knowledge dissemination among
CN members i.e., social events, meetings, new member induction
process. These mechanisms serve as a ”social” incentive to
encourage active involvement and engage new and old members
to CN processes and operation.
1) Social events and meetings: Large- and small-scale CNs orga-
nize gatherings and events to discuss not only CN organizational mat-
ters but also strengthen the bonds of community members through
social activities. Face to face meetings are common practices.
Depending on their morphology i.e., a single network or network of
networks, CN members have meetings weekly, monthly or annually.
CNs which are composed of smaller networks (guifi.net, Ninux,
Freifunk), tend to have weekly or monthly face to face meeting at the
local networks and an annual global meeting to get together and dis-
cuss the issues arising from the operation of the entire network. Other
CNs like AMWN, schedule frequent meetings (i.e., General Assem-
bly) when important organizational matters are up for discussion.
2) New member induction processes: Depending on the
mentality and philosophy of the particular CN, interaction with
network members is a natural prerequisite for a newcomer’s access
to the network. The way that this interaction is later on retained,
is possible to determine their individual participation level. For
example in AWMN or guifi.net, new participants are urged to
register and communicate with nodes of physical proximity to them.
After communicating with the node owners, they are able to receive
advice about the equipment they need and acquire assistance from
existing members in setting up their own nodes and joining the
network. Many node owners provide public contact information for
others to contact them. In cases, where actual interaction with node
owners is not possible or for complementary assistance, users can
register to the website and post their questions in the CN’s forum.
D. Education and training practices
Education and training of CN members is an important aspect
of CNs, addressing their members desire for acquiring new skills
and learn more about networking and radio technologies. Seminars,
workshops and online manuals are the main deliverables of this line
of effort, invested typically by members of the volunteers’ group
but also by other CN members.
1) Workshops and seminars: Several workshop and seminar
events are organized by existing CNs (AWMN, Sarantaporo.gr,
guifi.net). Experienced members share their knowledge with new
members, exchange ideas and present available technical solutions.
Guifi.net is quite active in organizing workshops and training
seminars i.e., guifi labs13 14, the SAX15, or supports related events
FOSDEM16, the Dynamic Coalition on Community Connectivity
(DC3)17.
AWMN workshops aim at enhancing members’ technical skills
by disseminating knowledge and technical expertise, interacting
with people that have the same interests, strengthening the
bonds within the community and new member training. In a
different approach, Sarantaporo.gr workshops are more focused
to the broader community of locals (with or without technical
expertise), inform people about the operation of the network and
share knowledge over the wireless networking principles and the
development of community networks.
13http://www.guifiraval.net/
14https://guifi.net/en/event
15https://sax2016.guifi.net
16Free and Open Source Software Developers’ European Meeting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FOSDEM
17https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/175-igf-2015/
3014-dynamic-coalition-on-community-connectivity-dc3
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2) Online material for DIY fans: CNs invest effort to derive
manuals and how-to documents so that users can learn more about
technical matters and be able to set up their own nodes. Freifunk,
Ninux, AWMN, guifi.net follow this practice and develop guides
that provide technical instructions on actions and requirements of
setting up nodes, FAQs and other useful information. Participants are
encouraged to self-educate and ”take matters into their own hands”
instead of relying to ”experts” and behaving as consumers of service.
In cases, where online material is not enough they can always get
advice in CN forums, or retrieve contact info of node owners.
E. Local applications and services as incentives
The applications running over the network can themselves be
considered as mechanisms motivating persons to join the network18.
Such services range from network connectivity to communication
and entertainment.
1) Proposed services: The CN literature has shown special
interest in services such as VoIP, community clouds and
crowdsourcing applications. Trusted VoIP service for nomadic
users in wireless network scenarios is the subject of [16], [28]
and [29]. Building upon an existing scheme, the Peer-to-peer
Wireless Network Confederation (P2PWNC), the work in [16],
develops a VoIP scheme utilizing residential Wireless LAN access
points (producers of bandwidth) for nomadic users (consumers of
bandwidth) as a low cost alternative to traditional GSM telephony.
In another generic setting in [28] and [29], authors experiment with
VoIP services for nomadic users using community-based Internet
access and identify their perceived challenges (trust on nodes, data
privacy and unspecified conditions of the wireless environment)
and performance limits (capacity, service quality, security).
Cloud services have also attracted a lot of attention as
fundamental privacy enablers, i.e., for storing the data of the CN
locally, without needing to interact with the public Internet. A
detailed discussion on clouds can be found in section V-B.
Crowdsourcing applications have the potential to match very
well the participatory nature of wireless community networks, i.e.,
participatory networking [63] and the strong community-oriented
social structure met in most developing regions. In the crowdsourc-
ing paradigm, individual users solicit information, content or service
from groups of people. The community dimension only strengthens
the case for such applications since the community bonds serve as
additional socio-psychological incentives for the active participation
and contributions of end users. The common resources shared by the
members can serve as the media where users (mobile or not) connect
to post tasks or get informed about available task announcements.
Users receive explicit rewards such as monetary payments, virtual
credits of services that match the services they offer [40].
2) Implemented services: Certain CNs have implemented a
broad variety of services and applications, while others are at a
more initial stage of service and application provision. In CNs like
Sarantaporo.gr and i4Free, the main service of interest is Internet
access. Yet, Internet access is not always on offer by the CN: Ninux
does not provide any Internet service at all; guifi.net offers the ability
only through private Internet service providers operating over the
18There are arguments both in favour of the importance of local services in
CNs [3], but also doubts that local services can make an impact on CNs considering
that public Internet covers any application needs on the side of the user [30].
CN; and, in other networks, such as the AWMN, members occasion-
ally share their Internet connections with other users through APs.
Networks built by people with technological background tend
to elaborate more on the provision of non-professional services.
Tools for communication such as chat, email servers, mailing lists,
wikis, forums, data exchange, entertainment like broadcast radios,
podcasts and streaming are common services found in most CNs
(AWMN, Ninux, Freifunk, guifi.net). AWMN and Ninux users have
also access to VoIP and chats, guifi.net users to videoconferencing,
AWMN and guifi.net users to local clouds and FFDN and Freifunk
and AWMN users to collaborative writing tools. Apart from
the basic services used in most CNs, there are also several CN
specific ones i.e., multi-player gaming, broadcasting, live streaming,
e-learning, local search engines (Quicksearch, Wahoo, Woogle) in
AWMN, web proxies, FTP or shared disk servers, XMPP instant
messaging servers, IRC servers, cloud services as the Cloudy
distribution [60] in guifi.net, Internet cube, BitTorrent tracker,
IndeCP or Internet service in FFDN, private VoIP service and
weather monitoring in Sarantaporo.gr.
F. Lawful framework of operation
An operational framework of CNs (legal status, rights,
obligations) which is not well defined may impede the attraction
of new participants. The level of support of CN initiatives by the
state or local administration has an impact on users’ decisions
to join or not the network [1]. When local authorities or another
third-party organization with clear legal status are involved, e.g.,
by signing licenses, the user’s concerns are easier overcome and
the decision to participate looks far less risky. The response of most
CN initiatives to these reservations is to develop legal entities, and
set forth licenses and agreements as legal documents specifying
the terms and conditions of participation in the network.
1) Operation as legal entities: The majority of CNs have
developed legal entities to represent the network to third parties
(Table III-B3). For example, Guifi.net created the guifi.net
Foundation, AWMN the Association of AWMN, FFDN consists
of non-profit member organizations registered as telecom operators,
Sarantaporo.gr operates as a non-profit civil partnership subject
to the Greek legal framework about NPOs, Freifunk has the
Forderverein freie Netzwerke e.V. as a reference NPO authority,
TakNet is a social enterprise and B4RN a community benefit society.
2) Licenses and Agreements: Besides the legal status, CNs
normally make use of legal documents, such as Licenses and
Agreements, to specify the frame of their members’ participation
and their own interaction with third-party entities.
Guifi.net and FFDN utilize a Network Commons License (NCL)
for establishing the rights and duties of subscribed participants.
Moreover, guifi.net has developed collaboration agreements (Type
A, Type B, Type C) that define the terms of conditions of third
party collaboration within the network. Any private sector entity
that wants to perform economic activities and use a significant
amount of resources of the network has to sign an Agreement
with the Foundation and participate in the compensation system
(section V-A4). Freifunk uses the PicoPeering Agreement that
promotes the free exchange of data within the network Ninux
participants comply with the Ninux manifesto, which is a variation
of the PicoPeering Agreement.
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Mechanisms Volunteers Users Private sector service providers Public agencies
Direct reciprocity x
Indirect reciprocity x
Punishment of free-riders x
Community currencies x x
Game-theoretic x x
Financial compensation x
Local data storage infrastructure x
Social events and meetings x x
New member induction processes x
Workshops and seminars x
Online material for DIY fans x
Local applications and services x
Operation as legal entities x x x
Licenses and Agreements x x
TABLE V: Incentive mechanisms and relevance to the CN stakeholders.
G. Incentive mechanism classification
Several of the incentive mechanisms that are described in sections
from V-A to V-F have never gone beyond the paper analysis stage.
On the other hand, several others are indeed applied in existing CNs.
The financial compensation system of guifi.net, the social events,
meetings and workshops organized by many CNs, the adoption
of licences in Freifunk and guifi.net, as well as the introduction
of a lawful operational framework serve, one way or another, as
incentive mechanisms that motivate the participation of different
types of stakeholders in CN initiatives, as shown in Table V-D2.
Some of these incentive mechanisms apply almost invariably to all
CNs. The lawful operational status, for example, is mandatory if the
CN wants to attract critical masses of users, but also private sector en-
tities and the support from public agencies. Equally common among
CNs is the care for social events and meetings that can strengthen
the links between their members and satisfy socio-cultural motives
of users. On the contrary, incentive mechanisms of economical
nature, such as the financial compensation scheme and the donation
certificates issued bu guifi.net for tax deduction purposes are more
relevant in CNs that support commercial operations over them.
For sure, it would be rather wise to match the incentive
mechanisms with the different stakeholder types. Hence, volunteers
would be more responsive to incentive mechanisms that underline
political and cultural causes; private sector service providers would
respond, maybe exclusively, to incentive mechanisms with economic
implications; and local authorities will be much more prone to get
involved when they realize that public expenses can be saved or
some political strategic objective be served through this involvement.
By far, the majority of incentive mechanisms target CN users. One
aspect that is not well understood is how the effectiveness of a mech-
anism varies with different features of the community; namely, if we
could have a characterization of a community according to a fixed
set of attributes (urban vs. rural, educational level, professional back-
ground, dominant political preferences) that could predict which
incentive mechanism would best mobilize its members. An impor-
tant parameter in this context is the size of the community. Char-
acterizations along attributes is easier if the community is small19
and with roughly uniform interests and professional background. As
19But not too small. The CN will not be sustainable if there are not enough human
resources to pull from.
their size grows, such characterizations become harder and so does
any attempt to predict the suitability of incentive mechanisms.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The survey has examined the issue of sustainability in community
networks and the various aspects within political, socio-cultural
and economic perspectives for CN participants. Special focus has
been given to the economic sustainability of CNs. Open access
network infrastructure models were presented and compared to
tradition telecom business models while possible funding options
from private and public entities and CN members were analyzed.
Economic sustainability is a challenging issue which seems to be
a necessary but not the only sufficient condition for approaching
a sustainable operation of the CN. Socio-cultural and politic
perspectives are needed as well.
Chosen CNs were studied with respect to actual and theoretical
mechanisms for enhancing sustainability by organizing and encour-
aging member participation. Each CN is composed by four basic
types of entities (i.e., volunteers, private sector entities, users, public
agencies). These entities experience their own motives for joining
the network and take part in mechanisms deployed to organize their
contributions. In order to match their political, socio-cultural and
economic interests, corresponding mechanisms have to be in place.
It appears that sustainability cannot be reached following a set of
exhaustive rules and there are no clearcut answers for approaching
it. However, checkpoints or indicative guidelines can be used to
assess it. These can be summarized in the following evaluation
form following the fieldwork in [30].
A. Economy
1) Market and model of provision:
• To which extent is the community network supported by
non-profit/community based network access and services
provision?
• To which extent does the community network rely on a
commercial provider? What is the nature of this provider (e.g.
for-profit vs. social enterprise, or local vs. non-local)?
• To which extent does the model of network provision of
the community network face competition from commercial
for-profit telcos on the basis of quality of signal/provision,
lower cost and/or better network maintenance?
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2) Resources:
• To which extent does the community network manage to
survive economically, i.e. to afford the necessary hardware
and labour-power necessary for running the network?
• To which extent can the community network ensure that it has
enough resources, supporters, workers, volunteers, and users?
• To which extent does the community network rely on internal
funding sources?
• To which extent does the community network rely on external
funding sources? How regular are they?
• Are there possibilities for the community network to
obtain public or municipal funding or to co-operate with
municipalities, public institutions or the state in providing
access and services?
• To which extent does the community network rely on a
single individual or a small group of actors for providing the
necessary resources (time, skills, money)?
3) Network wealth for all:
• To which extent does the community network provide
gratis/cheap/affordable network and Internet access for all?
• If subscriptions are used, are they affordable?
• To which extent are there different pricing schemes such as for
residential users, small enterprises, bigger firms, and public
institutions (e.g. schools)?
• How can the community avoid or lower the digital divide?
• What technological skills are required of the average user to
benefit from the community network?
4) Needs:
• To which extent are the community needs served by the
community network?
• To which extent are the needs of diverse individuals (e.g. by
gender, age, nationality) and groups in the community served
by the community network?
• To which extent are the needs of local businesses served by
the community network?
B. Politics
1) Participation/governance:
• How is the community network governed? How does it decide
on which rules, standards, licences, etc. are adopted?
• To what extent does the community network allow and
encourage the participation of community members in
governance processes?
• To what extent are there in place mechanisms for conflict
resolution and for proceedings in the case of the violation of
community rules?
2) Data ownership and control:
• To which extent does the community network enhance the
protection of privacy of user data?
• To which extent does the community network provide oppor-
tunities for active user involvement in the management of their
data? What are the skills required and how are they provided?
• To which extent and for how long are user data kept in servers
controlled centrally (e.g. by the network administrators)? How
do you guarantee that data storage is done in line with data
protection regulation and is privacy-friendly?
C. Culture
1) Community spirit:
• How closely knit is the community? To which extent are trust
and solidarity present and how are they manifested?
• To which degree is the community network a geek public that
has an elitist, exclusionary culture or a community public that
is based on a culture of unity in diversity?
• To which extent does the community network provide
mechanisms for learning, education, training, communication,
conversations, community engagement, strong democracy,
participation, co-operation, and well-being? In what ways?
• To which degree is the community network able to foster a
culture of togetherness and conviviality that brings together
people? In what ways?
D. Future research directions
Having looked carefully into the broader issue of sustainability,
our future work is going to focus in specific CNs and will seek to
propose incentive mechanisms that can address the sustainability
challenge. This is going to be pursued through different directions.
One direction is on the effort to import elements from the guifi.net
model such as the involvement of professionals in the network and
the provision of commercial services over it. More specifically, part
of the work will be devoted to analyzing the incentive mechanisms
that guifi.net has put in place: the sustainability of its compensation
system, which is the main tool for incentivizing the participation of
commercial entities in the CN; and the exportability of this model
to the newer and promising Sarantaporo.gr CN.
A second, related direction, is through the launch of an open
source mobile application over the CN that realizes mobile crowd-
sourcing and sharing economy practices. We will analyze incentives
(i.e., game theoretic tools, reciprocity theories) that can be embedded
in the application to maximize its use, and through that, the use of the
CN. Following the prototype of the application released in [20], we
will then design incentives to accommodate the agricultural services
that are of interest in this case, taking into account the particularities
of the CN network such as the ownership of network nodes and
network connectivity alternatives that are available in the area.
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